ually assign no-code status until a patient is near death, patient participation is often impracticable. By that time, the patient's incompetence may obviate obtaining patient consent."
B. Legal Constraints on Coding Decisions
Although medical discretion in determining coding status is ostensibly constrained by the doctrine of informed consent, courts fail to demand strict informed consent requirements, and other tort causes of action are ineffective.
Informed Consent
Over the past twenty-five years, courts have established a qualified requirement" that physicians inform their patients about the nature and risks of proposed therapies and available alternatives. 14 Despite the recent expansion of the informed consent doctrine to a wide range of medical interventions, 5 the courts do not enforce strict informed consent requirements in no-code decisionmaking. This reluctance stems from a judicial misperception that there are no patient choices involved in no-coding and that informed consent is impracticable for CPR procedures contingent upon an unpredictable future event. In the leading decision on no-code SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYsicIANS' TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 82 (1978) (describing incident in which resuscitation of 80-year-old retired nurse against her will generated conflict between nurses and medical staff).
12. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 77 (patient likely to be incompetent when no-code decision made). Almost all patients become incompetent at some time before a cardiopulmonary arrest. A physician at the scene of a cardiopulmonary arrest may exercise medical judgment to determine the intensity of the CPR effort. See AMERICAN HEART ASS'N, TExTBOOK OF ADVANCED CARDIAC LIFE SuPPORT at xviii-4 to xviii-8 (1981) . For example, one physician has advocated giving only fiveminute resuscitation attempts to all patients more than 65 years old. See Baer, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation After Age 65, 43 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1065 (1979) (letter to the editors).
13. There are two major exceptions to the requirement of informed consent. The "therapeutic privilege" allows a physician to withhold a diagnosis from his patient when disclosure would seriously jeopardize the recovery of an unstable patient. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ; Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093 , 1103 (1960 . The "emergency exception" allows a physician to proceed with treatment when the patient is incapable of consenting and the harm from a failure to treat exceeds possible harm from the proposed treatment. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89; Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (5d Cir. 1970 ). An attempt should still be made to secure a relative's consent if possible, but the physician may proceed with treatment if immediate care is required. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. 14. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, (D.C. Cir.) (announcing standard of disclosure independent of prevailing professional standards), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ; Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957) (requiring disclosure of all facts necessary to form basis of informed consent); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093 , 1106 -07 (1960 (requiring disclosure of nature of disease and proposed treatment, risks, probability of success, and availability of alternatives).
15. See, e.g 
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Vol. 93: 362, 1983 No-Code Decisionmaking decisionmaking, 6 the court deferred to the expertise of the medical profession under the assumption that assigning a no-code decision involves no discretion 17 unless there is some hope of restoring the terminally ill patient to a normal cognitive existence. 18 Honoring a patient's wish for heroic medical intervention, such as CPR, would recognize the intrinsic value of autonomous patient decisionmaking that should outweigh any effect on the patient's prognosis.
Courts have not required informed consent in emergencies 9 or in situations in which patients may become greatly distressed as a result of the disclosures necessary for informed consent. 20 Although CPR arguably falls within this emergency exception, 1 determining the coding status soon after a patient enters the hospital would increase the time available for deliberation and thus minimize the need to invoke the emergency exception. 2 Courts should therefore limit the emergency exception for a CPR treatment decision to cases in which CPR must begin before the patient sees a physician. 2 3 16. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 475, 380 N.E.2d 134, 139 (1978 Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) . Where therapy is likely to be successful and nontreatment will probably be fatal, the ultimate issue becomes whether refusal of therapy constitutes suicide. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977) . Performing CPR does not, however, usually prevent death. See infra note 51 (low survival-to-hospital-discharge rate). Furthermore, there is a distinction between active intervention to cause death and passive refusal to intrude without permission upon a clinically dead patient. See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 146-51 (1970) (noting passive euthanasia emphasizes caring for needs of dying, not hastening death).
23. When CPR is begun outside the hospital before the patient is seen by a physician, neurological signs other than consciousness do not correlate with long-term outcome. See Earnest, Yarnell, Merrill & Knapp, Long-term Surtvial and Neurologic Status After Resuscitation from Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest, 30 NEUROLOGY 1298 , 1302 (1980 . Without either patient consent or predictive criteria for recovery available, clinicians must act on the assumption that a life may be saved by continuing resuscitation efforts.
Courts should also be wary of a physician's claim of "therapeutic privilege"-that disclosing information necessary to give an informed consent would significantly harm the patient. 4 Courts must narrowly interpret this privilege if they are not to defeat the very purposes of informed consent, although patient anxiety associated with the dialogue concerning nocoding may be significant. 5 If honest dialogues about the foreseeable likelihood of a cardiopulmonary arrest were routine, however, patients would come to expect to have such conversations 26 and would therefore suffer less anxiety from them. Courts should restrict the therapeutic privilege to the relatively rare circumstance where disclosing the required information would significantly harm the patient. 27
Traditional Tort Remedies
In theory, courts may impose tort liability upon the negligent physician for failure to attempt resuscitation, for improper resuscitation, or for resuscitation against a patient's will. A negligent failure to attempt resuscitation may subject a physician to liability for wrongful death. 2 8 If the physician improperly terminates the professional relationship with the pa- 24. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 387-92 (1974) ; Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 460-61 (1979 App. 1966 ) (noting that abandonment occurred when physician failed to see patient after hospital admission). Because abandonment is a breach of contract, no expert testimony is required to establish a community standard of practice. By contrast, expert testimony is typically required in a claim of medical negligence. See Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829, 833 (1st Cir. 1968) (distinguishing abandonment from negligence).
30. The patient may allege battery in a medical procedure if the physician did not obtain informed consent. See, e.g., Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 114, 234 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1967) (radiation treatments); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 155, 223 A.2d 663, 669 (1966) (Del. 1980 ) (ordering court hearing on requests for no-code order and respirator removal by spouse of comatose patient); In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 701, 434 N.E,2d 601, 608 (1982) (allowing physicians to obtain no-code order for abandoned newborn); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 469-70, 380 N.E.2d 134, 136 (1978) treatments. Finally, defendants may successfully argue that failure to resuscitate cannot be the proximate cause of death of a patient whose heart and lung functions have stopped. 38 The battery remedy similarly possesses only limited effectiveness. Withholding medical treatment does not constitute battery because there is no nonconsensual contact. 3 9 Because patients usually die despite the unwanted invasion of CPR, 40 they cannot bring suit, and the family may not know of any wrongs or may be too aggrieved to pursue legal action. Most importantly, juries and judges may be unsympathetic to claims arising from heroic actions undertaken by medical personnel to save a life even if taken against the expressed wishes of a dying patient or his family. 4 1
C. Deleterious Results from Current Practice
Both the resuscitation of a patient who does not desire heroic efforts and the failure to resuscitate a patient who does desire such efforts violate the individual's autonomy. This violation of human dignity is particularly significant because of the life-or-death consequences of the coding choice." 2 Moreover, the scope of this violation of individual autonomy is likely to increase substantially in the future as CPR techniques become more elaborate and hospitals install more advanced physiological monitoring sysnity standard of negligence with judge-made standard), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
37. See, e.g., supra note 12 (five-minute resuscitation attempts on elderly patients tems." s Because most Americans die in a hospital or nursing home rather than in their home,"' CPR practice potentially affects a large number of citizens.
Assigning a patient a no-code status without obtaining his approval may amount to ending a human life without consent," 5 an egregious wrong when that life may be prolonged at small expense. 46 Such paternalism also denies the individual the opportunity to come to terms emotionally and spiritually with death and dying. 4 The no-code decision involves true choices, because modern medicine may prolong life in nearly all instances, albeit sometimes with little hope of long-term survival. A no-code determination also intrinsically involves non-medical considerations. A physician's determination of no-codes may therefore result in an imposition of the physician's values that is both inconsistent with patient preferences and unjustified by technical expertise. Under the current system, for example, the likelihood of receiving no-code status increases for those divorced, nonambulatory, or incontinent. 4 8
The automatic initiation of CPR efforts on all patients who are not nocoded, by contrast, violates human dignity and the right to bodily integrity of those who do not desire resuscitation. 4 ' CPR may involve electric shock, intubation with artificial respiratory ventilation, and even open-chest in-
See Coskey, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Impact on Hospital Mortality-A Ten-Year
Study, 129 W.J. MED. 511, 515 (1978) (optimal in theory to monitor every hospital patient); Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 14 (noting tendency in medicine to apply new technology indiscriminately when available).
44. See S. BoK, supra note 26, at 244 (more than 80% of Americans die in hospitals or other institutions); J. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 154 (most Americans die in hospitals). , 45 ternal cardiac compression." 0 Chronically ill patients, who dominate hospital populations, may not wish to undergo CPR measures knowing that even if CPR is "successful," they have little chance of surviving until hospital discharge. 51 Even physicians who obtain their patients' consent to a coding status need not follow defined requirements that would adequately inform the patient about the nature of CPR procedures, their attendant risks, and the alternative treatments. 5 2 An uninformed consent does not recognize the value of individual dignity implicit in autonomous choicemaking and may merely amount to coerced assent. 5 " Patients given the opportunity to agree to full-code status without full information may live to regret the outcome.5
II. A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE No-CODE DECISION
In contrast to the usual treatment of medical decisionmaking as a fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient, this Note adopts a structural analysis which considers the suitability for making the no-code decision of each major actor in the process and criticizes currently available alternatives from a procedural standpoint.
Courts currently rely upon the fiduciary doctrine as a structural description of the physician-patient relationship. 5 Unfortunately, courts 50. See In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 702, 434 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (1982) (noting CPR sideeffects include further weakened condition, pain, neurologic and liver damage); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 468-69, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (1978) ignore the inherent tension between the fiduciary as the ultimate decisionmaker and the patient's right to self-determination. 8 In informed consent cases, courts tend to balance values, 5 " and the patient's choice often loses out to the preferences of others."
The participants' relative positions and incentives in no-code decisionmaking determine their most effective functions. This relational structure takes into account the increasing emphasis upon patient participation and self-determination in contemporary physician-patient relations. 59
A. The Patient
The patient is usually in the best position to evaluate his human needs. 6 0 He can best assess his present physical and emotional pain in 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) , grafted the fiduciary's duty of disclosure onto the physician's duty of care under tort negligence principles.
56. The fiduciary relationship assumes a single stereotyped relationship with an incompetent beneficiary. It is thus clearly incompatible with the notion of autonomy and self-determination.
57. Courts commonly balance individual interests against state interests in determining whether the state should require treatment. See, e.g., In re Spring, 80 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209 , 1220 , 405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (1980 formulating a decision whether to prolong his life." 1 Furthermore, in evaluating economic costs, the patient is free from the conflict of interests that beset the family, 2 the hospital, 6 " or even the state." Focusing on a patient's desires also avoids difficult evaluations of the patient's social worthiness. 65 The decision most directly affects the life of the patient, and he should have responsibility for that decision.
B. The Physician
The physician is best able to determine the viability of the patient and the likelihood of recovery in case of a cardiopulmonary arrest. A decision to no-code a patient is not simply a medical decision, however. Economic0 6 and moral 67 concerns also deserve consideration. The person most affected by the decision can most adequately assess these factors. Furthermore, physicians left to their own means might consider characteristics of patients that may not be acceptable to the patient or society. 8 The conscien- , 52 N.Y.2d 363, 390, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 279 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting in part) (extraordinary medical procedures often involve economic cost that may affect hospital's incentive to institute or continue such care).
Physicians may also have financial conflicts of interest in a particular case. Two Los Angeles physicians were criminally prosecuted for unplugging a comatose patient's respirator and passively allowing him to die without nutrition. The'prosecution alleged that the doctors sought to hide a potential malpractice problem that occurred after abdominal surgery which resulted in coma. There are, of course, some disadvantages for the physician in adopting an informed consent stan-tious physician may feel more secure in an explicitly stated system of coding and feel more comfortable without the burdens of making crucial nonmedical decisions for patients.
C. The Patient's Family
Although it is currently common practice to obtain permission to nocode a patient from a patient's family, 9 the family is not necessarily in a better position than the patient to evaluate the patient's desire to live. 70 A patient's family is, however, useful in determining what an incompetent patient's desires are or what these desires were prior to incompetency. 71 The family is also in a better position than the patient to seek legal sanctions for perceived unfairness in the assignment of the no-code status.
D. The State
The state has an important interest in promoting the preservation of life. 2 Since life-saving technologies are available, albeit sometimes only at great cost, this norm may seem compromised by any procedural system allowing patients to die without attempting to prolong their lives. The state's interest in the preservation of life, however, diminishes in decisions involving utilization of invasive technologies on patients already on the dard. Physicians do not enjoy confronting a patient with questions concerning no-coding or statements describing the patient's terminal condition. They also face additional administrative burdens from documenting the disclosures and consents, and from approaching third-party decisionmakers for further adjudication of controversial issues. The physician may feel threatened by the possibility of lawsuits resulting from standards subject to judicial change; violation of a clearly stated standard could 'd, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980),  ret,'d on other grounds, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981 A.D.2d 431, 450, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 533 (1980) (strong public policy to value and protect sanctity of life), modified sub nor. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) . brink of death. 7 " Moreover, the state's interest in preserving life may conflict with certain fundamental values, including the right to bodily integrity, 7 4 self-determination," 6 and privacy. 76 These rights, unlike the state's interest in preserving life, remain in force even when the death of the individual is certain. The right to bodily integrity is fundamental and may be breached only in certain defined circumstances. 77 Violations of bodily integrity are often allowed only following an informed consent. 7 ' A complete CPR attempt requires extremely invasive procedures, yet an individual may cherish privacy in the final moments of life. 7 73. See In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Oh. 1980 ) (value of life diminishes if no hope of recovery); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (holding that state interest in life weakens as prognosis dims), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) ; In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 465-66, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 543 (1980) (maintaining that patient's lack of health lessens state interest in protection of life), modified sub non. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) ; cf. In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978 ) (holding that regardless of prognosis, individual's right of privacy against coerced leg amputation overcomes state interest in protection of life).
The avoidance of "passive euthanasia" for nonterminally ill patients is another instance in which the state seeks to preserve human life. Such a policy ignores the tragedy of the present acceptance of passive euthanasia for terminally ill patients who may desperately desire to live. Moreover, prolonging the agonies of patients who want to die does not pay homage to the sanctity of life. The present system both expends scarce medical resources upon those who may not want to live, see supra note 54 (describing results of resuscitation without patient permission), and denies life-saving treatment to those who may desire to be saved. The unnecessary denial of resuscitation may be due to either the failure to obtain direct patient consent, see supra note 11, or the expenditure of finite medical resources that could be spent on saving the lives of those who intensely desire to be saved, see G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 189 (1978) (observing that a system that offers "kidneys for everyone" prices these patients' lives exceedingly high compared to the lives of other patients who, for similar expenditures, could also have been saved). 74. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905) (right to inviolability of body), aff 'd, 224 Il1. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) ; Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (right to freedom from nonconsensual invasion of bodily integrity). 75. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) (fundamental right to determine what is done with own body), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972) (right to determine submission to treatment); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (adult's right to determine what shall be done with own body). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (noting that woman's decision regarding abortion is protected by fundamental right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (zone of privacy protects distribution of contraceptives); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (describing constitutional right of privacy in penumbra of specific Bill of Rights guarantees). 77. This policy applies even to autopsies in the absence of unusual circumstances or informed consent from kin. See, e.g., Wilensky v. Greco, 74 Misc. 2d 512, 512-13, 344 N.Y.S.2d 77, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1973 ) (Orthodox Jewish parents of deceased enjoined autopsy); Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613, 615-16, 197 S.E. 163, 163-64 (1938) . 728, 737-38, 370  N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977) (use of measures to prolong life may isolate family from loved one).
76.

III. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH PAST REFORM PROPOSALS
Major proposals for reform would still impede individual choice in nocode decisions. Generalized, objective tests cannot satisfactorily approximate the subjective wishes of individual patients: hospital policies vary greatly and are largely unenforceable; probate courts and hospital ethics committees can neither accommodate large numbers of cases nor provide the requisite monitoring; and living wills have only a limited ability to ascertain and preserve the choices of patients.
A. Current Hospital Policies
Hospital policies vary broadly in procedures required for no-code decisions. 8 0 It is apparently uncommon for a hospital policy to state explicitly that a physician should obtain informed consent from a competent, terminally ill patient prior to assigning a no-code status." 1 Moreover, no known hospital policy requires a physician to obtain informed consent for resuscitation of all competent patients who are at substantial risk of a cardiopulmonary arrest. Finally, where formal policies and procedures for nocoding do exist, lack of monitoring systems renders such policies largely unenforceable. 8 2 If a patient opposes any in-hospital treatments, he may choose to leave the hospital "against medical advice." 8 The inflexibility of choice, how- Some of the more sophisticated hospital policies regarding no-coding, which generally originate in university-affiliated hospitals, have been published in the medical literature. None, however, requires that a physician anticipate a probable cardiopulmonary arrest by asking the patient about coding status. Furthermore, no published hospital policy requires informed consent to fully code any patient. All hospital policies allow physicians to obtain no-coding consent as they please. See, e.g 81. An unpublished American Bar Association study surveying northern California hospitals shows that hospital policies rarely state such a requirement explicitly. The study probably includes more progressive hospitals than would a nation-wide sample, and therefore is biased in favor of including stricter requirements of informed consent for no-codes. 1040, 1041 (D.S.D. 1978) (Veterans Administration hospital held negligent for ever, forces the patient either to undergo resuscitation against his will while in the hospital or to suffer an unnecessary risk of a shortened lifespan by leaving needed medical facilities."'
B. Hospital Ethics Committees and Probate Courts
Court decisions have equated the requirements for informed consent in terminations of life-maintenance technology and in no-code decisions. 85 This reasoning would logically lead to the adoption of the procedure mandated by the Quinlan court: the hospital ethics committee would make every initial decision, based upon the physician's and family's recommendations. 8 Other courts, however, have recommended using probate courts to sanction life-terminating decisions either by patients or by their guardians. 8 allowing murderer to sign out against medical advice without warning police); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 844, 44 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1947) (husband allowed to sign out schizophrenic wife against medical advice).
84. Furthermore, hospitals and physicians have not uniformly adopted formal discharge procedures, and no standardized monitoring devices exist to check against abuses or imposed biases. , 657 (1982) . Finally, patients who are nonambulatory or without community social support, including caring relatives or economic backing, may be precluded from exercising the option of leaving the hospital. See, e.g., R. BuRT, supra note 11, at 9-10 (blind and nonambulatory bum patient, David G. . 92 (1976) . The Quinlan court was confronted with a patient in a "chronic persistent vegetative state" who nonetheless did not meet brain death criteria. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. Relying upon the medical experts' belief that death would likely occur if physicians removed the artificial respiratory support, see id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655, the Quinlan court vested decisionmaking authority in a hospital ethics committee as a means of diffusing responsibility and as a monitoring mechanism against any improper motives by the family or physician, see id. at 49- 51, 355 A.2d at 668-69 417, 433-35 (1977) (proposing that denial of life-prolonging treatment should be made initially by probate courts); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 550 (1980) There are, however, material structural elements distinguishing the removal of life-maintenance technology from no-code decisions. First, nocode decisions occur more frequently" and may overwhelm a procedural system unable to accommodate a large number of cases. Second, if a physician is unable to obtain a no-code decision, he can use subterfuges not available in the decision to remove life-maintenance technologies, such as transferring the patient to a facility that lacks CPR teams," 9 running a minimal CPR effort, 9 0 and using unwritten or erasable coding systems."' The monitoring of no-code decisionmaking must therefore be administratively uncumbersome, or physicians will resort to subterfuges. Hospital ethics committees and probate courts, however, are both cumbersome 2 and passive. 9 3 Third, no-code decisions require an immediate judgment, while decisions to remove life-sustaining devices are subject to less urgent time restraints. The decision not to resuscitate must be made in advance of the unpredictable timing of a cardiopulmonary arrest." Once a patient is already on life-maintenance technologies, however, time for deliberation exists. 9 5 (recommending probate hearing after appointed guardian and committee of doctors certify that the patient is in terminal condition), modified sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d  64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) 11, 16 (1981) (determining that incidence of severe brain damage with coma among successful resuscitations averages five per cent). Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 704, 713, 434 N.E.2d 601, 605, 610 (1982) 96-97 (1981) Finally, no-code systems implicitly involve all patients, whereas Quinlan-type procedures involve only incompetent patients. 9 6 If the individual desires of a patient are of paramount concern, third-party decisionmaking by the hospital committee or probate court is therefore less necessary in no-code decisions, since the vast majority of admitted hospital patients are competent.
See In re
C. Living Wills
Living wills are signed documents in which a person requests that his life not be unnecessarily prolonged if he becomes terminally ill. 97 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have passed "natural death acts" 9 8 acknowledging the legitimacy of living wills. Living wills cannot, however, combine sufficient flexibility with enough specificity to incorporate necessary procedural safeguards. An unpredictable medical condition may, by itself, have such a significant impact on a patient's decision so as to make every real circumstance sui generis. 99 Social and economic situations may change rapidly in a medical crisis. Because living wills depend upon voluntary advance initiation by the individual patient without solicitation by the physician, they cannot have the necessary comprehensive scope in influencing all coding decisions."' 0 IV.
TOWARD PATIENT CONTROL OVER NO-CODE DECISIONMAKING This Note proposes a model consistent with the previously discussed structural considerations. Choices exist for both the competent terminally ill and the non-terminally ill patient. All patients should determine their own coding status at the time of hospital admission. Clear disclosure standards and the use of monitoring systems, including second medical opinions and review by patient advocates, will facilitate preservation of patient choice. Courts will need to restructure liability rules to incorporate the proposed changes in medical decisionmaking.
A. Recognizing That Choices Exist
Contrary to the current medical community presumption that nonterminally ill patients should never be assigned no-code status, the Note proposes that all competent patients should retain the choice to receive a no-code status after hearing an informed appraisal of their prognoses, the nature of CPR procedures, and the risks and benefits of resuscitation. Patients should be allowed to decide that the risks and benefits of heroic resuscitation efforts do not justify the intervention, because the patients can best take into account the quality of their own lives and the benefits and disadvantages of prolonging their existence should they suffer a cardiopulmonary arrest in the hospital. 10 1 On the other hand, terminally ill patients should not be no-coded against their will. Prolonging life should remain an alternative, even if one with little hope. 10 2 An individual may earnestly be awaiting an expected future event, such as the birth of a grandchild, and might be willing to bear all possible costs in hopes of living long enough to experience this last joy. The knowledge that one has a terminal illness may also affect an individual's consent to treatments as well as to the coding decision. 1 0 3 If informed consent is to have substantive meaning, courts should require disclosure of the determination that a patient is terminally ill.'" 101. See supra pp. 371-72, 102. This is contrary to the present judicial presumption that there is no choice available for the terminally ill patient with an irreversible condition. See, e.g 
B. Eliciting the Patient's Decision
Merely answering a patient's questions does not satisfy a physician's duty to disclose. 10 5 Physicians must directly inquire about a patient's feelings regarding coding status after fully informing him about CPR measures. Clarity and specificity safeguard both the patient's and the physician's interests in decisionmaking. Obtaining every patient's consent upon admission to the hospital would allow more time for deliberation and ensure that consent is obtained before the patient becomes incompetent.
An attending physician should also clearly document the nature of the patient's illness and prognosis as well as the patient's desires after his physician has given him a reasonably thorough appraisal of CPR measures. 106 The physician should repeat this procedure whenever the patient's medical condition changes materially. 0 Physicians and the other hospital staff members should clearly document all resuscitation efforts, as well as the circumstances of in-hospital deaths. The chief of the medical department should routinely review these reports.
For incompetent patients, waiting for a probate court to appoint a guardian may not be feasible if cardiopulmonary arrest occurs shortly after admission. It may therefore be necessary to appoint a guardian ex ante for such occasions'°8 or to make the designation on the basis of the nearest kin. 1 ' 0 Such a solution avoids the difficulty present in living wills of having to anticipate all possible situations. 1 1 Modifications to the proposed failure to inform of rights).
105. See supra p. 370. 106. A clear, unambiguous coding determination on the front of the patient's medical chart is necessary to alert all hospital personnel who must react immediately should a cardiopulmonary arrest occur. Such a record would also facilitate monitoring by physicians and patient advocates who later review that record.
107. The proximity of the choice of coding assignment to the cardiopulmonary arrest is important. Cf. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (1981) (patient's statement of desires in close proximity to operation is highly probative of choice not to have life prolonged). The decision by a competent patient remains in force if incompetency ensues prior to the cardiopulmonary arrest, because the original choice was based on an informed evaluation of possible contingencies, including the possibility that incompetency would precede a cardiopulmonary arrest.
108. See Van Scoy-Mosher, supra note 11, at 16 (recommending that everyone have a guardian). 109. A designation on a basis that uses an established hierarchy avoids confusion if multiple family members are available for consent. There may be an exception to the nearest-kin designation when the spouse has initiated divorce proceedings against the patient. 110. A guardian, familiar with the patient's personality and lifestyle, may be the individual best suited to choose what the patient would have desired. Additionally, the guardian's decision may have special legitimacy directly derived from an appointment by the patient for these particular purposes. See, e.g., In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 439, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (1980) (fellow priest closest companion familiar with patient priest's wishes), modified sub noma. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d  363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) ; In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 885, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (Sup. Ct.) (accepting fact that adult patient's mother was sensitive to his needs), aff'd, 78  A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438  N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) . procedure may be necessary when the patient is a child 1 11 or a pregnant woman. 112 
C. Preserving a Patient's Choice
To reduce the possibility of judgmental error or even personal bias, 1 a second attending physician's concurrence with the nature of the illness and the prognosis should be required before an assignment of a no-code status. 114 To encourage independent responsibility, this physician should be held jointly and severally liable for negligence in this evaluation. The peer review by a second physician adds an element of monitoring to the no-code decision without resort to more complex bureaucratic approaches, such as committee reviews, which probably cannot in any case guarantee perfect accountability. 11 5 Clarification of procedures by itself functions to limit abuse.
A patient advocate, preferably with a nurse's training, 1 6 should also screen all involved medical charts within twenty-four hours after the physician certifies that the necessary conditions exist for a no-code assignment. The patient advocate should also review no-code orders on a regular basis. A patient should be able to rescind a no-code order at any time.
D. Changing Legal Liability Rules
Courts should award a substantial minimum amount of tort damages, based on a cause of action in battery, 17 to the plaintiff for violation of human dignity if physicians attempt to resuscitate him without obtaining his informed consent reasonably soon after his admission to the hospital. 1 8 If the patient consents to a full-code status, however, there is in effect an assumption of risk for resulting medical and emotional costs that may result from a CPR effort, 1 ' unless there is negligence in the CPR performance. Failure to honor a full-code decision or failure to obtain informed consent for a no-code assignment should result in civil 120 or even criminal penalties. 1 2 The proposed system more sharply defines these liability rules compared to the present system, which suffers from nonuniformity and a lack of explicitly defined coding procedures. The clarity of these proposed rules would provide adequate notice to potential violators. 1 22
CONCLUSION
This Note urges a more honest and accountable treatment of a patient's desires. The values of self-determination and autonomy should not diminish in importance with the approach of death. Failure to honor these values renders the competent patient incompetent through lack of knowledge and robs the patient of human dignity through lack of choice. The dying patient should determine what is precious, whether it be a heroic intervention or an acknowledgment of privacy and bodily integrity.
-Dean M. Hashimoto
